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Overconfidence is one of the most ubiquitous biases in the social sciences, but the evidence 
regarding its overall costs and benefits is mixed. To test the possibility that overconfidence 
might yield important relative benefits that offset its absolute costs, we conducted an 
experiment (N=298 university students) in which pairs of participants bargain over the unequal 
allocation of a prize that was earned via a joint effort. We manipulated confidence using a 
binary noisy signal to investigate the causal effect of negotiators’ beliefs about their relative 
contribution on the outcome of the negotiation. Our results provide evidence that high levels 
of confidence lead to relative benefits (how much one earns compared to one’s partner) but 
absolute costs (how much money one receives overall). These results suggest that 
overconfidence creates an inefficient equilibrium whereby overconfident negotiators benefit 
over their partners even as they bring about joint losses. 
Keywords: Overconfidence, motivated beliefs, negotiation 
 
 
Statement of Relevance 
Overconfidence is one of the most well-documented biases in the social sciences, but the 
evidence regarding its costs and benefits is mixed. We present an experiment that attempts to 
reconcile these inconsistent findings by investigating the tension between relative and absolute 
costs and benefits. Our findings suggest that high levels of confidence can lead to an inefficient 
equilibrium. They also provide an explanation for why overconfidence can be both costly and 




Overconfidence is one of the most ubiquitous biases in the social sciences, but the evidence 
regarding its overall costs and benefits is mixed. For example, on the cost side of the equation, 
overconfident people often fail for lack of sufficient planning (Shipman & Mumford, 2011; Xiao 
et al., 1997) and fail to reach negotiated settlements because they think they can get a better deal 
(Babcock et al., 1995; Bazerman & Neale, 1982; Neale & Bazerman, 1985). On the benefit side, 
people often defer to their overconfident peers (Anderson et al., 2012; Murphy et al., 2015), in 
part because overconfidence is persuasive (Schwardmann & van der Weele, 2019; Soldà et al., 
2019; von Hippel & Trivers, 2011). For example, overconfident job applicants are perceived as 
more qualified than well-calibrated ones (Ronay et al., 2019), and overconfident negotiators 
generate higher gains than well-calibrated ones when they reach an agreement (Benos, 1998; Kyle 
& Wang, 1997). Indeed, the more people demand the more they get (Galinsky & Mussweiler, 
2001; Moore, 2004; White & Neale, 1994), and greater confidence leads to greater demands 
(Kramer et al., 1993; McGillicuddy et al., 1984; Thompson & Loewenstein, 1992).  
One way to reconcile the costs and benefits of overconfidence is to consider whether a contested 
outcome is perceived in relative or absolute terms. Absolute benefits matter, of course, but relative 
outcomes loom large whenever people jockey for status, which is determined entirely by how one 
compares to others (Brosnan & De Waal, 2003; Buss, 1989). As a consequence, people will 
sometimes reduce their absolute outcomes if that sacrifice enables them to improve their ranking 
relative to others (Charness et al., 2014). In the case of overconfidence, the costs tend to manifest 
in absolute terms (e.g., failure or injury), but the benefits emerge primarily in relative or inter-
personal terms (Anderson et al., 2012; Murphy et al., 2015; Murphy et al., 2018). Although 
relative and absolute benefits typically go hand-in-hand, relative benefits can accrue at an absolute 
cost (e.g., when a competition injures or depletes both parties but yields a clear winner).  
In the current investigation we explore the hypothesis that overconfidence yields relative gains 
even in the presence of absolute costs. To test this possibility, we examine the costs and benefits 
of high levels of confidence in a distributive negotiation – a form of dispute resolution in which 
win/win or pie-expanding outcomes are not possible. Distributive negotiations emerge whenever 
people compete over assets that have equal value to both parties, and hence negotiators are 
prevented from arriving at a mutually satisfying resolution in which each party chooses their 




solutions, distributive solutions are nonetheless common, as both sides often fail to recognize 
win/win opportunities (Thompson & Hrebec, 1996). Such outcomes are particularly likely when 
competing parties perceive their interests as diametrically opposed (Bazerman & Neale, 1983). 
For example, despite the fact that both workers and management are highly dependent on the 
success of their company, they often see their interests as being in direct opposition to each other. 
When their disagreements are sufficient to lead workers to strike, both parties enter distributive 
negotiations with the added quality that the time spent to reach a settlement becomes an additional 
and substantial cost to both parties. This form of “shrinking pie” negotiation is the canonical model 
of bargaining in economics (Rubinstein, 1982) – as it captures the costs of both delays and failure 
to reach a settlement – and is the situation we simulated in the current research. 
Such negotiations are an example of “mixed motives” games, as they are characterized by a blend 
of cooperative incentives (reaching a deal) and conflictual incentives (reaching a better deal) 
(Schelling, 1961). This blend of incentives creates a trade-off between being conciliatory and 
intransigent. In such a context, overconfidence may simultaneously generate relative benefits and 
absolute costs. By enhancing intransigence, overconfidence might improve ones’ outcome relative 
to others while simultaneously introducing delays and reducing the chances of a successful 
negotiation, to the detriment of both parties. 
To test this possibility, we adapted an experimental design from the game “Divided” (van Dolder 
et al., 2015), in which pairs of participants must agree on how to allocate a prize resulting from a 
joint effort. The prize can only be allocated unequally, to avoid the common default to share any 
joint outcome 50/50, and participants negotiate over who gets the larger share. To isolate the causal 
role of confidence in this context, we chose to manipulate confidence rather than measure it as an 
individual difference variable. In service of this goal, prior to the negotiation we provided “noisy” 
feedback to participants, which indicated they were likely to have performed either better or worse 
than their partner.  
There are two important points to make with regard to our manipulation of confidence: First, our 
experiment focuses on the form of overconfidence in which people over-place their performance 
relative to others (the second type of overconfidence defined by Moore and Healy, 2008). Second, 
by manipulating confidence we have removed the aspect of overconfidence that is clearly an error 




partner, and hence are arguably engaged in a Bayesian integration of the feedback they have 
received. For this reason, from this point forward we use the more neutral terms high and low 
levels of confidence to refer to levels of over- or under-confidence that emerged as a result of our 
manipulated feedback.  
Method 
The experimental design and hypotheses were pre-registered on AsPredicted.1 Note that we have 
occasionally clarified the hypotheses for expositional purposes and we relegated the hypotheses 
and analyses on agreement failures to the SOM-R (section 2). No data point was excluded from 
the analyses.  
Participants: We recruited a total of 298 participants via Hroot (Bock et al., 2014), mainly among 
students from local engineering, business, and medical schools. The experiment was conducted 
over a series of 21 sessions that involved an average of 14 participants per session, and 
participation took place in GATE-lab (Ecully, France). Overall, 54% of the participants were 
female and the average age was 23 years (SD = 5.48).  
Participants were paid the sum of their earnings for each phase in addition to a five-euro show-up 
fee. The experiment took an average of one hour and the average payoff was 15.71 euros (SD = 
6.72). Participants received their payment in private at the end of the experiment. Our intent was 
to run 300 participants. With that sample size, the minimum detectable effect size with statistical 
power at the recommended .80 level was Cohen’s d=0.32 for mean comparisons between 
participants who received a good signal vs. a bad signal and Cohen’s d=0.46 for mean comparisons 
between the four possible combinations of signals (Cohen, 2013). 
Procedure and Measures: The experiment was programmed using o-Tree (Chen et al., 2016) and 
was composed of four parts, which we refer to as the ‘individual phase’, the ‘partner phase’, the 
‘manipulation phase’, and the ‘negotiation phase’. We used the individual phase to match 
participants in pairs. In the partner phase, both participants in a pair answer general knowledge 
questions to build a joint prize. In the manipulation phase, we elicit participants’ beliefs about their 
performance in the partner phase relative to their partner’s performance. In the negotiation phase, 
pairs of participants negotiate the allocation of their shared prize. The unfolding of the experiment 
 








Fig. 1. Schematic representation of the experimental design. Schematic representation of the 
experimental design. Participants take a quiz and their correct answers contribute to a joint prize. 
After the quiz, they receive noisy feedback about who is likely the best performer in the pair. The 
prize money is then divided into two unequal shares and participants claim the share they want. If 
they claim the same share, they can argue via chat for up to three minutes, at which point the prize 
starts shrinking. The value of the prize diminishes steadily to zero after 30 seconds if no agreement 
is reached. 
 
Individual phase. Participants answered ten general knowledge questions individually. For each 
question, they choose the correct answer from among four options. Participants received 0.2 euro 
for each correct answer. At the end of the individual phase, participants were ranked according to 
their performance on the quiz. The participant with the highest score was ranked 1 and the 
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Participants build a joint prize 
by answering quiz questions.
The prize is split into two unequal shares. 
To reach an agreement, participants first 
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session). Participants were not informed of their rank, and they only receive information about 
their score and their payoff for this stage at the end of the experiment.  
Partner phase. Participants were matched in pairs according to their rank: The participant ranked 
n was matched with the participant ranked n − 1, the participant ranked n−2 was matched with the 
participant ranked n−3, and so on until all participants were paired. This pairing procedure was 
common knowledge among participants and was intended to clarify that both members are able to 
contribute to the joint prize more or less equally. Participants then answered 30 general knowledge 
questions individually. The questions used in both stages of the experiment are available in the 
SOM-U (section 1.3). As in Part 1, the questions were the same for all participants and they were 
to choose the correct answer from four options. Participants received 0.67 euro for each correct 
answer and the money earned by both participants in each pair was allocated to a joint account. To 
prevent participants from inferring each other’s performance from the value of their joint account, 
the productivity p of the pair {i, j} was randomly drawn from a uniform distribution U(0.75, 1.25). 
If we denote ci the number of correct answers of participant i and cj the number of correct answers 
of participant j from the pair {i, j}, the value v of the joint prize of the pair {i, j} is computed as 
follows: v{i,j} = 0.67*𝑝{i,j}*(ci+cj). 
Manipulation phase. After participants completed the 30 general knowledge questions, we elicited 
their beliefs about their absolute and relative performance in the partner phase. First, participants 
were asked to report their beliefs about the number of questions they answered correctly in the 
partner phase. Participants received 1 euro if their estimate was exact or deviated from their true 
performance by only one question, and 0.50 euro if their estimate deviated from their true 
performance by two questions. If the estimate deviated by more than two questions, they did not 
earn or lose anything. Participants were then asked how likely it is that they outperformed their 
partner in the partner stage. Participants indicated their belief on a scale from 0 to 100% on a slider 
without incentives. 
We then manipulated participants’ belief about their relative performance by giving them a private 
‘noisy’ binary signal, using a procedure adapted from Schwardmann and van der Weele (2019). 
The ‘noisy’ feedback is designed to create random variation in participants’ confidence about their 
relative contribution, without deception. Each participant was shown two cyber-urns containing 




selects a ball from one of these two urns. If the participant performed better than his partner in the 
partner phase, the ball is drawn from the urn with fifteen green balls and five red balls. If the 
participant performed worse than his partner in the partner phase, the ball is drawn from the urn 
with five green balls and fifteen red balls. Therefore, a participant who outperformed his partner 
is more likely to see a green ball and a participant who was outperformed by his partner is more 
likely to see a red ball.  
After the ball was shown to participants, we then elicited their beliefs about their relative 
performance in the partner phase again. After this final belief elicitation, the value vij of the joint 
prize was displayed on the screen and participants were asked to decide how to share their prize 
via a three-stage negotiation process. Participants had been told that they would split the prize in 
the partner phase, but were only given instructions on the details of the split and the negotiation 
procedure after the last belief elicitation. 
Negotiation phase. Participants were informed that their joint prize has been divided into two 
unequal shares. Their task is to reach an agreement on the allocation of these shares. The large 
share is equal to 70% of the joint prize (0.7vij) and the small share is equal to 30% of the joint prize 
(0.3vij). The negotiation process is divided into three stages. Participants have the opportunity to 
reach agreement in each of the three stages. However, vij decreases in Stage 3. The unfolding of 
the stages was described to participants before they entered the negotiation process.  
In Stage 1, participants were asked to claim either the high share or the low share and to write a 
message to their partner to justify their choice. There was no time constraint in this stage. If the 
negotiators from the same pair claimed different shares, an agreement was reached: the participant 
who claimed the large share received 0.7vij and the participant who claimed the small share 
received 0.3vij. In this case, the negotiation process ended in Stage 1 and participants did not enter 
Stage 2 or Stage 3. If both negotiators claimed the large share in Stage 1, they proceeded to Stage 
2. Both participants would also enter Stage 2 if they both choose the small share in Stage 1, 
however, this situation never occurred in our experiment. 
In Stage 2, participants who did not agree in Stage 1 were given three additional minutes to try to 
reach an agreement. During these three minutes, participants could communicate via a chat box 
with their partner. The communication within pairs was only restricted in two ways: participants 




information that would remove their anonymity. They were reminded of the amount allocated to 
each share, their own decision in Stage 1, and their partner’s decision in Stage 1. They could decide 
to switch from the large share to the small share at any time by hitting the corresponding button 
on their screen. An agreement was reached when one of the negotiators in the pair switched from 
the large share to the small share. In this case, the participant who claimed the large share received 
0.7vij, the participant who claimed the small share received 0.3vij, and the negotiation ended. If no 
agreement was reached within the allocated time, participants proceeded to Stage 3.  
In Stage 3, participants were given thirty additional seconds to try to reach an agreement. For each 
second spent in this stage, the value of joint prize and hence amount in each share decreased 
linearly and proportionally, such that both shares were equal to zero at the end of the thirty seconds. 
Participants could observe on their screen the value of the shares decreasing in real time (i.e., 
shrinking every second). The shares stopped shrinking when one participant chose the small share. 
In this case, the participant who chose the large share received the remaining amount allocated to 
the large share, and the participant who switched to the small share received the remaining amount 
allocated to the small share. If no one switched before the end of the thirty seconds, both 
negotiators received nothing, and the total value of the joint prize was lost.  
At the end of the negotiation phase, participants completed a demographics questionnaire in which 
they were asked to report their gender, age, and their risk preferences. We elicit risk preferences 
by asking participants to indicate how willing there were to take risks in general on a scale from 0 
to 10 (Dohmen et al., 2005). 
 
Results 
For each pair of participants {i, j} we have four possible combinations of signals: i received a bad 
signal/j received a good signal, both i and j received a bad signal, both i and j received a good 
signal, i received a good signal/j received a bad signal. The payoffs associated with each of these 
combinations are displayed Table 1, with absolute outcomes depicted in the left panel and relative 
outcomes depicted in the right panel. Absolute payoffs are measured as the percentage of the initial 
prize received by each participant after the negotiation. This measure incorporates the possible 
loss of prize money in the negotiation process: When the prize money shrinks, the sum of absolute 




the final prize (i.e., the remaining amount of the joint prize at the end of the negotiation) received 
by each participant. Relative payoffs only reflect how well players do compared to each other, not 
relative to the initial amount they could have received. 
The average absolute payoffs were lower when both participants received good signals than when 
both received bad signals. For pairs of participants who received opposite signals, the participant 
with the good signal received more than the participant with the bad signal in both relative and 
absolute terms. 
Table 1. Players’ payoffs as a function of their own signal and the signal of their partner.  
Absolute Payoffs Relative Payoffs 
Player j Player j 




Good  26.96%  35.89%  50.00%  44.67% 
26.96% (n=46) 44.46% (n=102) 50.00% (n=46) 55.33% (n=102) 
Bad  44.46%  39.18%  55.33%  50.00% 
35.89% (n=102) 39.18% (n=48) 44.67% (n=102) 50.00% (n=48) 
 
Identification Strategy 
Because a participant’s confidence in our experiment is likely to be correlated with unobserved 
characteristics (for instance dominance, extraversion, dispositional overconfidence, etc.), we 
cannot rely on raw confidence levels to establish a causal relationship between participants’ 
confidence and their outcome in the negotiation stage. Instead, to avoid the pitfalls of endogeneity, 
we used the exogenous variation in confidence that emerged from the noisy component of the 
signal given to participants. The signal is informative about the true state of the world (i.e., whether 
the participant performed better than her partner) because it is accurate in 75% of cases. Hence, it 






Fig. 2. Distribution of prior and posterior beliefs for participants who are the best performer in the 
pair (top panel) and participants who are not the best performer in the pair (bottom panel). 
 
Nevertheless, the signal observed by a participant is completely random and exogenous 
conditional on the true state of the world (i.e., a participant gets a good signal randomly with 75% 
probability if he/she was the best in the pair and with 25% probability otherwise). Because we 
know whether the participant was the best performer of the pair, we can perfectly control for 
whether they outperformed their partner by using the noisy signal as an instrumental variable 
(Woodbridge, 2010) for participants’ posterior beliefs.2  
Figure 2 shows the distribution of posterior beliefs separately for the better and worse participants 
and whether they received a good or a bad signal. For both types of participants, we found no 
difference in beliefs prior to the signal (Mann-Whitney tests (best): Z = 0.597; p = 0.551;3 Somer’s 
d = -0.0264; with 95% CI = [-0.117 ; 0.0643]; (not best) Z = 0.114; p = 0.909; Somer’s d = -
0.00484; with 95% CI = [-0.867 ; 0.0770]) and a strong difference in beliefs after observing the 
 
2 Indeed, when we enter performance and the signal into a simultaneous regression predicting 
confidence, being the best only has an impact on confidence prior to seeing the signal. Once people 
receive the noisy signal, being the best has no remaining impact on their confidence (see Table 
S2.9 in SOM-U). 




signal (Mann-Whitney tests (best): Z = -6.416; p<0.001; Somer’s d = 0.271 with 95% CI = [0.187 
; 0.356]; (not best) Z = -6.442; p<0.001 Somer’s d = 0.264 with 95% CI = [0.182; 0.346]).4  
These results show that participants are very reactive to the signal, making it a strong instrument 
for our subsequent analyses. To ensure that the feedback could only influence outcomes through 
its impact on private beliefs, participants were not allowed to discuss their feedback directly with 
their partner. These features of the design ensured the validity of our instrumental analysis. 
Negotiation Outcomes 
Next, we implemented the instrumental variable strategy described above to assess whether the 
patterns observed in Table 1 are due to the causal effect of participants’ confidence on their 
negotiation outcomes. In service of this goal, we estimated the effect of both participants i and j 
from the pair {i, j} instrumented by the signals received on participant i's absolute and relative 
outcome using 3-stage least square (3SLS) regressions. The marginal effects from the 3SLS  
regressions of a participant’s increase in confidence conditional on her partner’s confidence on 
both her absolute and relative payoff from the negotiations are displayed in Figure 3.  
The upper panel of Figure 3 shows that an increase in participant i’s confidence leads to an increase 
in her absolute payoff when her partner j has low confidence (belief j = 20%, see the blue line). 
However, when the partner j has high confidence (belief j = 80%), participant i is penalized for 
having higher confidence (see the red line). This interaction between the participant’s confidence 
and her partner’s confidence is significant (β = -0.0148, Z = -2.67, p = 0.008, 95% CI = [-0.0257, 
-0.0039]), regardless of whether the participant is the best performer of the pair. These results 
confirm that the pattern observed in the left panel of Table 1 is driven by variation in confidence 
generated by the noisy feedback participants received rather than by some combination of pre-
existing beliefs of the participants. 
 
 
4 If we assume that the mapping of beliefs to responses is symmetric for good and bad news, Figure 
2 also suggest an asymmetry in the assimilation of good vs. bad news relative to the Bayesian 
benchmark (illustrated by a flatter dotted line from the mean prior belief to the mean posterior 
belief for participants who received a bad signal). We confirm this pattern in SOM-U Table 2.7, 






Fig. 3. Linear prediction (with 95% confidence interval) of the effect of participant i’s belief on 
participant i’s absolute (upper panel) and relative (lower panel) payoffs when participant j’s belief 






In contrast to these findings with the absolute payoff, the relative payoffs are symmetric when both 
participants have the same degree of confidence (either high or low), with no such interaction in 
the lower panel of Figure 3. The effect of a participant’s own confidence is significant (β = 0.212, 
Z = 2.22, p = 0.026, 95% CI = [0.0250, 0.399]), and having greater confidence than one’s partner 
has a positive effect on relative payoffs secured (β = 0.216, Z = 14.69, p < 0.001, 95% CI = [0.188, 
0.245]), regardless of whether the participant is the best performer of the pair. These estimates 
confirm that the pattern observed in the right panel of Table 1 reflects the causal effects of beliefs 
on payoffs. Overall, these results suggest that higher levels of confidence can be beneficial in 
relative terms, even when they come at a cost in absolute terms. Table S2.3 in the SOM-U shows 
that these results hold when excluding pairs of participants who agreed in Stage 1, suggesting that 
the results are not just driven by participants who did not interact with their partner. 
Agreements 
Other aspects of the negotiation process also suggest that high levels of confidence within pairs of 
negotiators lead to conflictual negotiations and hence to a smaller final prize. Figure 4 displays the 
percentage of agreements reached in each stage of the negotiation. Overall, 6.04% of the pairs 
reached an agreement in Stage 1, 36.24% in Stage 2 (seconds 1 to 180) and 42.95% in Stage 3 
(seconds 181 to 210). 14.77% of pairs did not reach an agreement at all and came up empty-handed. 
The spikes in agreement around 180 seconds suggests that, perhaps unsurprisingly, most pairs 
agreed either at the end of Stage 2 (14.77%) or immediately when the shares start to shrink in Stage 
3 (32.89%). Figure 4 also shows that delays or failures to reach an agreement occurred frequently, 
suggesting a substantial amount of the initial prize was lost in the negotiation process. Such delays 
and failures are driven in part by pairs of negotiators who are both high in confidence. The left 
panel of Table 1 shows that the average percentage of the initial prize awarded at the end of the 
negotiation among pairs of participants who received two good signals is 26.43% lower than the 
share awarded to pairs of participants who received signals of opposite valence (Mann-Whitney 






Fig. 4. Distribution of the time needed to reach an agreement (in seconds) across all pairs (n=149). 
Stage 1: participants only state their preferred share. Stage 2: participants can argue about their 
preferred share. Stage 3: the shares shrinks to zero over 30 seconds if participants do not reach an 
agreement. 
 
To further investigate the causal effect of confidence on the outcome of the negotiation, we 
estimated the effect of the sum of participants’ beliefs on the percentage of the initial prize that 
remained to be shared after the negotiation. We instrumented the sum of beliefs with the noisy 
signals using two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression, as the noisy signals create exogenous 
variation in the overall sum of confidence in the pair. Results are displayed in Table 2. Models (1) 
and (2) in Table 2 show that a 10-percentage point increase in confidence at the pair level leads to 
a 4 percentage point decrease in the percentage of the initial prize that is awarded after the 
negotiation (β = -0.422, Z = -2.33, p = 0.020, 95% CI = [-0.778, -0.0671]). Models (3) and (4) 
show a similar effect when considering only pairs of negotiators who reached an agreement before 
the end of the negotiation process (β = -0.363, Z = -3.01, p = 0.003, 95% CI = [-0.599 to -0.127]), 




provide evidence that high levels of confidence lead to conflict that is detrimental to the outcome 
of the negotiation process.  
 
Table 2. Effect of confidence on the outcome of the negotiation. 
Dependent var.: Remaining percentage of the initial prize 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Beliefi + Beliefj -0.401 -0.412 -0.340 -0.362 
p-values 0.022 0.034 0.003 0.005 
95% CI -0.744 to -0.0587 -0.0793 to -0.0311 -0.562 to -0.118 -0.616 to -0.108 
     
Performance Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Demographics No Yes No Yes 
     
Constant 111.20 133.09 100.99 107.25 
p-values <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
95% CI 69.31 to 153.08 62.98 to 203.20 74.62 to 127.35 63.65 to 150.86 
Observations 149 149 127 127 
F-Stat first stage 17.66 10.73 14.67 9.13 
Chi2 5.62 14.60 13.42 17.44 
Note: Columns (1) to (4) report the 2SLS estimates of the sum of beliefs of participant i and j from 
the pair {i,j}, instrumented by both i and j signals on the percentage of the initial prize that is 
awarded at the end of the negotiation process. Columns (1) and (2) show the results for all pairs. 
Columns (3) and (4) show the results only for pairs of participants who reached an agreement. We 
control for both participants i and j’s performance in the partner phase in all models. We control 
for both i and j’s demographics (gender, age, and risk preferences) in columns (2) and (4). 
 
Communication 
Finally, it is worth asking how the effects of confidence manifested themselves via the actual 
negotiation process.5 To address this question, the initial messages participants sent each other 
 




were coded for the presence or absence of two types of claims, which we labelled Entitlement (e.g., 
“I deserve the larger share because I performed better”) and Assertiveness (e.g., “I’m not going to 
back down and take the smaller share”). Next, three raters evaluated the Perceived Confidence in 
the messages on a 6-point scale (0=not at all confident to 5=completely confident; Kappa = 0.24). 
These initial messages that participants sent each other can be considered independent, as they had 
not yet read what their partner wrote. Recall that after that initial message, participants were also 
given a chance to chat further, and this subsequent chat was coded for confidence on the same 6-
point scale. Four findings of note emerged from these analyses. 
First, participants’ post-signal self-reported confidence had a positive impact on the likelihood that 
their messages were assertive and made claims of entitlement, and assertiveness and entitlement 
in turn mediated the positive effect of participants’ self-reported confidence on rater-perceived 
confidence in their initial message (see Figure S2.6 in SOM-U). Second, rater-perceived 
confidence in participants’ initial message was positively associated with rater-perceived 
confidence in their subsequent chat, and a positive correlation emerged between the perceived 
confidence in the chat of the two partners (see Figure S2.5 in SOM-U). Third, when we enter 
assertiveness, entitlement, and self-reported confidence into a regression predicting absolute and 
relative outcomes, the effects of self-reported confidence remain the same as those reported above 
(see Table S2.8 in SOM-U). Fourth, assertiveness mirrored the effect of confidence, in that people 
who made claims that they would not back down performed better in relative but not absolute 
terms. 
Discussion 
The results with absolute payoffs suggest that when both players have a high level of confidence, 
the situation is not in equilibrium. When one player is highly confident the other player is better 
off being less confident, as under those circumstances they both receive a higher payoff. In 
contrast, when one player is not very confident the other player is better off being highly confident, 
as under that circumstance the more confident player earns more. These findings suggest that in 
terms of absolute payoffs, high levels of confidence are beneficial in negotiation only when your 
partner is low in confidence. These findings are broadly consistent with the prior literature, which 
shows that overconfidence is beneficial when you reach an agreement (which is more likely when 




partner is also high in confidence). But neither this pattern of findings nor the prior literature 
explains why overconfidence remains so common despite these clear costs. 
To answer that question, we must turn to relative payoffs. When we examine the relative outcomes, 
the situation where both players have high levels of confidence is in equilibrium because neither 
negotiator has an incentive to be less confident. If Player i is not confident, Player j is better off 
being confident and if Player i is confident, Player j is still better off being confident. Importantly, 
this positive effect of confidence is independent of whether an agreement is reached, as our 
experiment captured the type of costs that emerge when overconfidence creates an impasse as well 
as when overconfidence simply introduces delays. These results demonstrate that the goal to 
achieve higher relative outcomes will favor the development of overconfidence despite the fact 
that overconfidence creates absolute costs. Thus, our research clarifies why the obvious costs of 
overconfidence do not lead people to become better calibrated. By focusing on relative rather than 
absolute outcomes – as people often do (Buss, 1989; Charness et al., 2014; von Hippel, 2018) – 
overconfident negotiators are prevented from feeling they have suffered a loss even when they 
walk away with little or nothing.  
Beyond what these results reveal about overconfidence, they also elucidate the inter-relationships 
between competence, confidence, assertiveness, and entitlement. People who received a positive 
signal reported greater levels of confidence, which in turn led them to be more assertive and make 
greater claims of entitlement in their message to their negotiation partner. Assertiveness and 
entitlement caused their messages to be perceived as more confident, but controlling for 
assertiveness and entitlement did not impact the effect of confidence on either relative or absolute 
outcomes in the negotiation. As a side point, it is worth noting that the effects of assertiveness 
were similar to the effects of confidence; people who claimed they would not back down also 
performed better in relative but not absolute terms (consistent with the results of van Dolder et al., 
2015). The results also indicate that the effects of confidence can emerge independently of those 
of competence-based status, as the instrumental analyses removed the effect of being the best 
performer in the pair, and being the best was not predictive of confidence once participants 
received the noisy signal. 
The results of the current experiment also provide a bridge between research on confidence, 




has shown that a clear status hierarchy can benefit negotiators by providing cues on which they 
can coordinate when they have conflicting goals, thereby avoiding impasses (De Kwaadsteniet, & 
Van Dijk, 2010; Halevy et al., 2011). In contrast, when negotiation partners both see themselves 
as high or low in status, this coordination advantage is lost. Our results with high and low levels 
of confidence yielded similar effects with regard to absolute outcomes – if one member of the 
negotiating pair is confident, absolute outcomes are better when the other is not, and vice-versa. 
Thus, different confidence levels between competing parties can facilitate solutions to 
coordination problems.  
Similar results emerge when people experience dominance complementarity, as dyads and groups 
tend to perform better when their members vary in dominance than when their members are all 
high or low in dominance (Ronay et al., 2012; Wiltermuth et al., 2015). Despite these similarities 
across the literatures on hierarchy, dominance, and confidence, it is notable that levels of 
confidence only showed these complementary effects with regard to absolute outcomes. In relative 
terms, people were always better off being high rather than low in confidence. Given the 
similarities between these literatures, our results raise the possibility that hierarchy and dominance 
would reveal similar relative benefits and absolute costs when all members of a group are high in 
status or dominance. 
Caveats 
The current results suggest why overconfidence is common even when it is costly for everyone in 
absolute terms, but there are several caveats to keep in mind. First, our negotiation task was 
explicitly designed to incorporate a shrinking pie, with delay costly to both sides. Given the luxury 
of more time, it is possible that universally high levels of confidence would have been less costly. 
Second, our experiment was also designed to increase the probability of disagreement by 
mandating that the distribution be unfair, as people often reject unfair offers to protect their 
reputation (Nowak et al., 2000). Of course, many real-life negotiations also result in outcomes that 
one or both sides regard as unfair, and hence in that sense the situation we created in the lab is 
quite common. Lastly, our experiment was also a distributive negotiation with no opportunity for 
a compromise that would benefit both parties. As noted above, many negotiations are inherently 
of this type and many fall into this pattern unnecessarily (Thompson & Hrebec, 1996), but many 




issues and people have diverse preferences. Thus, future research might consider whether the 
current findings would emerge in less contentious circumstances. 
Conclusions 
The results of the current research suggest that high levels of confidence can emerge as an 
inefficient equilibrium in negotiation: people are relatively better off being more confident 
independent of whether their partner is also confident. As a consequence, situations in which 
people focus on relative outcomes are likely to select for strategically inflated self-beliefs. Thus, 
these findings provide clear predictions that overconfidence should be most evident whenever 
people prioritize relative over absolute gains (as in status competitions or among people who are 
particularly attuned to relative standing). Nevertheless, strategically inflated self-beliefs come at a 
cost, as both partners earn more in absolute terms when they are less confident. By considering 
both relative and absolute outcomes simultaneously, the current findings provide an explanation 
for why overconfidence is both costly and ubiquitous, as evolution can select for traits that enhance 
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Supplementary Online Material (Reviewed) 
 
1. Main text Analyses 
 
To investigate the causal effect of the participants’ confidence on their payoffs received from the negotiation, 
we regressed both the absolute payoff (as a percentage of the initial joint prize) and the relative payoff (as a 
percentage of the final prize)1 on the posterior beliefs of participants i and j about their relative contribution 
to the joint prize, as well as the interaction between the two players’ posterior beliefs. 
 
Table S1. Effect of beliefs on participants' payoff from the negotiation. 
Dependent 
var: 
Absolute percentage awarded to participant i Relative percentage awarded to participant i 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Beliefi 0.786 0.802 0.0071 0.0024 - - 0.212 0.249 0.212 0.184 - - 
p-values 0.020 0.021 0.957 0.986   0.522 0.460 0.026 0.072   


















             
Beliefj 0.356 0.382 -0.422 -0.423 - - -0.212 -0.142 -0.212 -0.208 - - 
























             
Beliefi*Beliefj -0.0148 -0.0154 - - - - 0.0000 -0.0013 - - - - 
p-values 0.008 0.009     1.000 0.839     













    
             
Beliefi–beliefj - - - - 0.219 0.229 - - - - 0.216 0.204 
p-values     0.040 0.034     <0.001 <0.001 
95% CI 










             
Best -4.629 -4.015 -4.629 -4.189 -4.971 -5.133 -5.304 -4.428 -5.304 -4.444 -5.639 -5.006 
































             
Performance Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
             
Demographics No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
             
Constant 20.24 24.74 58.80 64.94 43.29 50.83 52.65 50.75 52.65 54.02 52.82 53.14 
p-values 0.290 0.260 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 0.007 0.015 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
























Obs. 298 298 298 298 298 298 298 298 298 298 298 298 
R-Squared -0.0830 -0.0815 0.0023 0.0064 0.0022 0.0007 0.0129 0.0345 0.0129 0.0353 0.010 0.0311 
Chi2 22.33 22.71 14.66 15.16 8.29 9.80 17.17 26.96 17.17 27.00 397.50 245.99 
Note: Table S1 shows the effect of participant i’s and j’s beliefs on participant i’s absolute payoffs (columns (1) to (6)) and relative 
payoffs (columns (7) to (12)). Columns (1) and (2) display the 3SLS estimates of participant i’s and j’s beliefs, as well as their 
interaction on participant i’s absolute payoff. Columns (3) and (4) display the same estimates after removing the interaction  term. 
Columns (5) and (6) display the 2SLS estimates of the difference in beliefs between participant i and j on participant i’s absolute 
payoff. Columns (7) to (12) display the same set of estimates using participant i’s relative payoffs as the dependent variable. We 
control for participant i relative performance (i.e. whether participant i was the best performer in the pair in the partner phase) in 
all models. Control variables include participant i and j’s absolute performance in the partner phase, as well as participant i’s 
demographics (gender, age and risk preference). We use 1000 bootstrap replications with samples of one draw per pair.  
 
 
1 Both participant i and j’s relative payoff are set to 50% for pairs who failed to reach an agreement.  
We instrumented each participants’ posterior belief in a pair (beliefi or beliefj) by a dummy variable equal to 
1 if a good signal was observed, and 0 otherwise. In addition, we instrumented the interaction between the 
two players’ beliefs by the combination of signals received by the pair {i,j}. Because payoffs within a pair are 
dependent, as they are determined by only one participant (who switched from the high share to the low share), 
we use 1000 bootstrap replications with samples of one draw per pair (i.e., for each replication, one participant 
from each pair is randomly selected as an observation). To control for the potential correlation between the 
error terms of the three equations, we estimate the models using 3SLS. The estimated coefficients are 
displayed in columns (1) and (7) in Table S1. Columns (2) and (8) show the same estimation with additional 
control variables (i’s gender, age, and risk preference). To ensure the validity of our instrumental procedure, 
we control in all regressions for a dummy variable equal to 1 if participant i was the best performer in the pair 
in Part 2, and 0 if participant j was the best performer. In addition, we control for both participant i and j’s 
performance in Part 2. 
Because the interaction term is not significant in the context of relative payoff, we can remove it from the 
equation.2 We re-estimate models (7) and (8) without the interaction term and the new estimates are displayed 
in columns (9) and (10), respectively. Because the coefficients associated with participant i and j’s posterior 
beliefs are perfectly symmetric, we can also estimate a joint coefficient using the difference in beliefs between 
participant i and participant j as the main independent variable. Column (11) shows the estimates of the 2SLS 
regression of participant i’s relative payoff on the difference in beliefs between participant i and participant j, 
instrumented by both participant i’s and participant j’s signals. Column (12) displays the same estimates, when 
adding the same control variables as in models (8) and (10).  
For completeness, we also performed the same estimations as in columns (9) to (12) using the absolute payoff 
received by participant i as the dependent variable. The estimates are displayed in columns (3) to (6). However, 
these models do not consider the existence of an interaction between participant i’s and participant j’s beliefs 
and should be interpreted in this light. 
 
2. Pre-registered Analyses 
 
This section reports the pre-registered analyses that are missing from the main text, as they are secondary to 
our primary research question. 
 
2.1 Confidence and likelihood to concede 
 
We pre-registered that we would investigate the effect of confidence on the likelihood of accepting the small 
share. Table S2 displays the percentage of participants who accept the small share for pairs that agreed in (1) 
Stage 2, (2) in Stage 1 or 2, in (3) Stage 3, and (4) overall, conditional on the signal they received.3 
Participants who received a good signal are less likely to accept the small share in Stage 2 than those who 
received a bad signal and the difference remains significant when adding participants who agreed in Stage 1 
(two-tailed tests of proportion:4 Stage 2: z = 4.25, p < 0.001, Somers’ d = -0.41 with 95% CI = [-0.582, -
0.233], Stage 1 or 2: z = 4.83, p <0.001, Somers’ d = -0.43 with 95% CI = [-0.587, -0.270]). This difference 
disappears in Stage 3, when the share starts to shrink (PR test: z = -0.01, p = 0.993, Somers’ d = -0.01 with 
95% CI = [-0.174, 0.176]), which might be driven by the toughest negotiators being self-selected to enter the 
 
2 The fact that relative payoffs are perfectly symmetric (50% each) when both participants have the same degree of confidence 
(either high or low) is a strong indication that there should be no interaction between participants’ beliefs within the same pair. 
3 We pool observation from Stage 1 and 2 due to the very small number of pairs who reached an agreement in Stage 1 (9 pairs 
only). 
4 PR test hereafter. 
last stage. Over all stages, among all the pairs that researched agreement, those who received a good signal 
are significantly less likely to accept the smaller share than participants who received a bad signal (PR test: z 
= 3.39, p <0.001, Somers’ d = -0.21 with 95% CI = [-0.334,-0.092]). Probit regressions of the likelihood to 
switch from the large share to the small share on the difference in beliefs between participants i and j from a 
pair {i,j}, instrumented by the signals received by both i and j produce similar results (see SOM-U section 
2.2). 
 
Table S2 – Proportion of participants who accept the small share, by stage and signal received. 
Signal % of participants who accept the small share in 
Stage 2 Stage 1 or 2 Stage 3 All stages 
B 68.97%*** 69.57%*** 49.18% 60%*** 
 (6.13) (5.58) (6.45) (4.31) 
G 28% 26.32% 49.25% 38.71% 
 (6.41) (5.88) (6.15) (4.39) 
Obs. 108 126 128 254 
Note: Table S2 shows the proportion of participants who concede to the small share in different stages of the negotiation process, 
conditional on the signal they received. Standard errors in parentheses. Asterisks indicate the results of two-sample tests of 
proportions. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. 
 
2.2 Confidence and agreements 
 
To investigate the causal effect of confidence on the likelihood to reach an agreement, we pre-registered that 
we would estimate a probit regression of a dummy variable equal to 1 if the pair reached an agreement before 
the end of the negotiation process (and 0 otherwise), on the difference in posterior beliefs between participants 
i and j instrumented by both i's and j’s signals. We also pre-registered that we would estimate a 2SLS 
regression and a Poisson regression of the stage at which an agreement is reached on the difference in posterior 
beliefs between participants i and j, instrumented by both i’s and j’s signals. We later realized that the 
estimations of these models had some limitations. These limitations are discussed in section 2.4 of the SOM-
U where we propose new estimation strategies. 
